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The aim of the present study is to describe the major actors of the Hungarian judiciary in 
the light of the changes in the legal sphere fol lowing the peaceful revolution of 1989, 
taking into account the results of a number of research studies carried out f rom a legal 
sociological perspective. It appears that the role and structure of the Hungarian legal 
profession both changed quite markedly after the changeover owing to the new social 
and economic conditions, particularly because of the opportunities provided by the new 
market economy. In addition to offering a description of Hungarian lawyers, a major aim 
of ours here is to draw attention to a problem that, in our opinion, is the chief cause of 
the underlying defects in the judiciary system, namely the faults in the recrui tment of the 
actors of the judiciary. This phenomenon persists even now in the public sector, and 
poses a problem that needs to addressed. 
T h e legal profession in Hungary is generally of à high standard because of the elitist 
approach which once prevailed in the university education system, reinforced by a 
technocratic attitude characterising the Bench f rom the final period of the one-party 
system. However , the recruitment process in the legal profession is somewhat 
problematic, and it is our firm belief that the quality of the administration of just ice can 
be improved only if the recruitment process is thoroughly examined and revised, 
In today ' s Hungary,-political discourse focuses on the issue of European integration. 
However as regards the problems of the legal system and the judiciary, fairly little 
attention has been given in relation to the accession process. This may be explained in 
part by the fact that our legal system is generally considered democratic, the ongoing 
legal harmonisat ion process being right on track with the Brussels f ramework. 
Furthermore, the judic iary system virtually conforms to the European standards. As the 
measurement of the eff icacy of the judiciary is rather problematic beyond certain basic 
facts (e.g. protracted legal cases), it is very easy to make such claims. Nevertheless, the 
process of modernisat ion through legislation can in itself never truly reflect the real state 
of the judiciary. The mere adoption of rules does not solve the problem of enforcement. 
The failure of the constitutional attempts in certain developing countries is a perfect 
example of this. Adopt ing the most democratic legal principles in constitutions and 
codes is of no avail if their enforcement is frustrated by natural social resistance or by 
the given condit ions of the implementation of law. Since the political changeover, 
Hungary has definitely taken a major step towards the démocratisation of both the legal 
and judiciary systems. Numerous acts of historic importance have come into being. Still, 
only the radical legal positivists and normativists believe that all problems can be ironed 
out in this way. 
In order to reveal the true state of the Hungarian judiciary, the sociology of taw or, to 
be more precise, the analysis of Hungarian lawyers from a sociological angle is surely of 
the utmost importance. Unfortunately, there was scarcely any opportunity for such an 
analysis in the former era. Then, sociology as an exact science was to be refuted or 
merely tolerated by the ideologists of the Communis t party. The sharp conflicts between 
ideology and reality understandably irritated those who were well aware of the 
d i f ferences between the party propaganda and the actual situation. Nevertheless, the 
discipline gained some ground from the 1970s, and even comprehensive research was 
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carried out concerning Hungarian lawyers.1 Yet the results of this research became quite 
outdated following the dramatic events of the changeover, hence they cannot really 
contribute to the understanding of the present situation. 
In the past ten years the scope of research on lawyers has gradually broadened. 
Nevertheless, we still lack empirical studies which could assist us in the formulation of 
theories and provide a method for handling current problems. 
In Hungary, because of the peaceful nature of the change in the political system, 
there has been no radical replacement of staff within the judiciary. Popular demand for 
such replacement has been lacking, with the exception of some radical political forces. 
The view that some judges should be removed - which has been around in some form or 
other since the 70s - would have paralysed the judiciary anyway had it been acted upon, 
As we will see later on, it has merely led to slight increase in mobility within the legal 
profession. 
All this contributed to the fact that the characteristic phenomena of the socialist era, 
such as the capitalising on personal relationships, certain attitudes of the legal 
profession, and methods of legal interpretation survived or emerged in a different form 
later on. This is a rather involved problem, the analysis of which would require the 
investigation of the period before World War II as well. However, its major constituents 
are known and readily understandable even without resorting to such an in-depth study. 
In addition it appears that even without falling victim to normativism, one could 
reasonably expect legislative action to produce relatively rapid and profound changes in 
this field. The personality and attitudes of a judge or prosecutor are generally difficult to 
influence. However, the regulation governing their selection can be altered much more 
easily so as to promote a process that is fairer and sounder than the present one. An 
existing and functional recruitment system is called for where applicants with the most 
suitable personal and professional profiles are given priority. We are convinced that in 
countries operating a career system, i.e. one where legal actors of the judiciary are not 
elected but appointed, the standards of the administration of justice seem better and 
fairer. 
1. Problems of Methodology 
The aim of the present research has been to describe the actors of the Hungarian 
judiciary in the post-socialist period, paying particular attention to the mechanisms of 
selection and recruitment. A prerequisite for conducting such a survey was to define the 
target group that would serve as an object for our investigation. 
In Hungary the term „legal actors of the judiciary" is normally used in a restricted 
sense, covering only persons with a law degree working for state institutions directly 
responsible for the administration of justice, i.e. the Courts.2 However we considered it 
more appropriate to have recourse to a definition with a broader meaning including also 
the public prosecutors exercising their functions in criminal investigations and legal 
1 ANGELUSZ RÓBERT, BALOGH ZOLTÁN, KŰRMENDY MÁRIA, LEDERER PÁL, SZÉKELY MÁRIA: A 
jogászság társadalmi helyzete és szakmai életútja, Siociülúgiai fUzelek. Oktatási Minisztérium Marxizmus-
Leninizmus Oktatási Főosztálya. Budapest: 1977, p. 13. 
J FŰRÉSZ KLÁRA: Az igazságszolgáltatás alkotmányos szabályozása. Társadalmi Szemle 1998. 50: 4 6 -
3 In the broadest sense this category might include employees of the public administration and the law 
enforcement agencies. 
4 HYMAN, HERBERT: Survey Design and Analysis. Principles, Cases and Procedures. The Free Press of 
Glencoe. 1965. p. 121-137. 
5 SCHEUCH, ERWIN K.: Das Interview in der Sozialforschung. In König cd. Handbuch der Empirischen 
Sozialforschung. Erster Band. Stuttgart : Ferdinand Enke Verlag. 1962. p. 152-165. 
6 RUGG, DONALD: A Study of the No-Opinion Vote in Public Opinion Polls. Ph.D. diss. Princeton 
University, Princeton. 1941. 
7 ATIYAH, P.S.: Pragmatism and Theory in English Law. Stevens and Sons. London 1987, 
* ROGERS CARL R: The Non-Directive Methods as a Technique in Social Research. Americun Journal of 
Sociology 50. 1945. 
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proceedings before the Courts, the attorneys who play a significant role in settling legal 
disputes and the public notaries authorised under Hungarian law to discharge important 
duties generally carried out by state organs in other countries.3 
Bearing in mind the aims of our study, we decided to extend our survey to cover 
Hungarian law students as well since they represent the recruiting basis of future legal 
actors. By doing so we had the opportunity of acquiring background information that 
facilitated the understanding of the primary target groups of our research. In addition, 
this extension enabled us to discover and analyse a ,,pre-recruiting" stage of the whole 
recruiting process. 
It seemed more convenient to divide the target group of our research into clearly 
defined sub-categories because the diverse characteristics of legal actors in general make 
it virtually impossible to study this group as a whole. Thus we were able to determine 
the general or particular character of certain developments by comparing these separate 
but closely related sub-categories.4 
As regards the strategy of the study, our fact-finding method essentially consisted of 
the documentary analysis and evaluation of the results of previous surveys conducted in 
this field. Occasionally we also had to resort to standardised interviews in order to verify 
dubious information or unreliable sources. 
However , as regards the flaws in the recruitment process it seemed most suitable to 
conduct in-depth interviews. It is well known that the sensibility of the person being 
interviewed depends on the topics to which the questions are related. Those questions 
that are considered annoying or embarrassing are frequently referred to as „difficult" 
quest ions. ' The persons interviewed in a survey are usually unwilling to answer such 
questions, or will o f fe r a reply of „no-opinion".6 The scope and nature of the „difficult" 
quest ions are influenced by various factors including social environment. Due to the 
condit ions prevail ing in the Hungarian society the recruitment problems of the legal 
actors of the judiciary may definitely be classified as „difficult" questions. This state of 
affairs can mainly be attributed to the isolated and uncommunicat ive nature of the 
judiciary in general, but the fear that information about the problems of the profession 
might leak out and the possible external criticism it might provoke are also contributory 
elements.7 
Under such circumstances standardised interviews or questionnaires circulated by 
mail were thought unlikely to yield useful information. A permissive method of 
interviewing proved more effective, as a close and confidential relationship with the 
interviewer was found to result in a greater inclination to give genuine answers.8 The 
interviews were conducted in the year 2000. 
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The hypothesis of the descriptive research concerning f laws in the recruitment 
process was that the admission into judic ia l bodies and the subsequent internal 
advancement in the hierarchy thereof is, in a large number of cases, independent of 
object ive criteria. T h e expression „object ive criteria" is mean t to indicate certain 
abilities, skills or requirements that can be obtained or fu l f i l led in an absolute and 
relative sense by anyone.9 T h e absolute criteria involve cer ta in m i n i m u m standards 
required by legal regulations, such as nationality, law degree , per fec t c r iminal record. 
On the other hand, there are several indicators that are mean ingfu l only in comparison 
with other applicants, signalling the relative apti tude and prof ic iency of the candidates, 
for example factual knowledge, mental condit ion, cognit ive abili t ies, associa t ion skills. 
W e picked the high school grade point average, the qual i f ica t ion of the university 
diploma and the prescribed internal profess ional ratings as re levant part ial definitional 
indicators. 
T h e hypothesis of our explanatory research was that s ince the select ion p rocess lacks 
object ive criteria the selection is largely based on the 'capi ta l i sa t ion on acquaintances, 
i.e. utilising personal acquaintances or family ties in order to ensure the favourable 
assessment of the application. This hypothesis was substantiated by conduc t ing personal 
interviews with a relevant number of individuals.1" 
As a matter of fact, some hypothetical assertions and probabi l i ty s ta tements were 
made during both the descriptive and explanatory researches that a re not closely 
connected to our key problem but were nevertheless included in the text fo r easier 
understanding. In Hungary no similar research has so far been conduc ted . T h e r e f o r e we 
were not provided with accepted defini t ions and concepts or even settled hypotheses in 
advance. In a situation like this one inevitably turns to assumpt ions and probability 
s ta tements ." Hopeful ly , further research will be able to c lar i fy and e labora te on our 
conclusions, and reveal more accurate findings. 
2. Law Students. The First Step of the Selection and Socialisation Process 
Due to the special structure of the Hungarian legal system, to be able to unders tand the 
fol lowing description of the actors of the judic iary it is vitally important to examine the 
status of law students as well as the training of lawyers in Hungary . In cont ras t to France 
and other similar European countries, in Hungary the university is general ly the only 
place where lawyers can get formal training before getting a job . Legal educa t ion lasts 
10 semesters (5 years) and at the end of their studies, s tudents are required to take an 
oral examinat ion in the mos t important subjects, as well as the obl igat ion to write a 
thesis, On passing the final examinations, they are conferred the degree of doc to r of law. 
In the Hungar ian system, legal education has been unified, i.e. a lawyer hav ing a law 
The concept of objective criteria is constantly referred to in public or private communications in 
Hungary and is practically identical to the definition proposed by us. Therefore it is rather a corresponding or 
reporting definition according to the terminology employed by NOWAK, STEFAN: Methodology of 
Sociological Research - General Problems. (Hungarian transl.) Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
Budapest, 1981, p. 101. 
" The relevant number of individuals - taking account the target group and all of the sub-categories as 
well - has been determined with the purpose of securing an acceptable margin of erTor. 
NOWAK, STEFAN: o p . cit . p. 3 5 . 
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degree and 3-years ' work experience (up to 1997 only 2 years of occupation was 
prescribed) is al lowed to take the final professional examination to obtain a general 
qualification for any legal profession. Having successfully fulfilled the examination 
requirements they may become attorneys, or they can apply for other jobs , e.g. at the 
prosecutor ' s off ice or at the Courts. 
2.1. The Enrolment of Law Students 
The training of law students, fol lowing a several-hundred-year long history of organic 
development , took a sharp turn with the beginning of the communist era in Hungary. As 
in other segments of Hungarian society, the State initiated a strictly planned economy, 
and at tempted to take control over training and education as well. During this period the 
number of people having the opportunity of obtaining a degree was kept within strict 
limits by the ruling power. Only a small proportion of students, having obtained a high 
school diploma, was admitted to a college or university. 
Apar t f r om this, due to the strictly planned economy, fewer lawyers were needed in 
Hungary. Thus legal education was available only in three - later in four - Hungarian 
cities, where only a small number of students could participate in the training. The 
annual student intake at the faculties of law was about 100 in the 1980s. The submitted 
applications for law training typically exceeded the number of the available places two-
or three-fold even though, according to previous sociological research conducted in the 
1970s, white-collar workers encouraged their children to opt for professions of a higher 
esteem such as that of a physician or engineer. In the last decade of the so-called , 
„Kadar-era" , the prestige of lawyers was more or less restored, especially that of j 
attorneys, since it was considered one of the possible ways of getting „rich" in Hung?jy. 
In the early 1990s the government abolished the ceiling limitation on the number of 
attorneys, and the private sphere began to show signs of development as well. As a 
result, the attorneys were provided with more and more work assignments, further 
strengthening this trend. Consequently, a growing interest appeared in studying at the 
law schools. Meanwhi le the government initiated changes in educational policy, trying 
to find a way of handling the worsening situation of unemployment by opening up 
higher education with a view as well to increasing the number of people with a 
university degree. 
Interest in a legal career has been constantly growing since the democrat ic changes 
in the political system, and now it seems it has reached its peak. T h e founding of new 
faculties of law and the growth in the number of correspondence courses, which are 
becoming the most popular form of education and the most important source of income 
for the universities,12 also facilitated the above-mentioned process. According to data 
provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 1997 only one in every four applicants 
was admitted despite the fact that the number of enrolling students tripled. In 1998 this 
ratio slightly increased but still stayed well under one third (1 in every 3.34). Several 
years ago only a few thousand law students attended Hungarian universities, while at 
present more than 20, 000 do so. 
12 In Hungary, at present, law schools can be found in seven cities. These are Budapest, 
Debrecen, Győr, Kecskemét, Miskolc, Pécs, Szeged. 
In the socialist era, the enrolment was distorted by many factors . T h e first of them 
can be identif ied only if one takes into considerat ion the workings of a monoli thic 
political establ ishment . T h e success of an application to a universi ty was determined, 
inter alia, by social background, because those of a working class origin had an 
advantage over those whose parents were considered to pursue a white-col lar profess ion. 
The State wanted to demonst ra te the dominance of worker classes through this 
a f f i rmat ive action in the enrolment . This af f i rmat ive action policy gradual ly grew 
weaker , and in the late 1980s it came to an end. It was also c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e that 
political relat ions and personal acquaintances played a role in the ex t remely stiff 
entrance exams. Firstly, the ruling political power could pressure the academic board 
into support ing a certain applicant. Secondly, family ties or acquain tances could have a 
„posi t ive" inf luence on the evaluation of an appl icant ' s pe r fo rmance . Of course, in 
retrospect, it is difficult to determine the real extent of this unjust d iscr iminat ion, but 
certainly the distorting ef fec t concerning the enrolment of s tudents was qui te significant. 
From the 1990s, such possibilities have been significantly reduced because of the strict 
control over the procedure of admission exams. The capital isation on acquaintances is 
traditionally of ma jo r importance in Hungar ian society so, consequent ly , a total 
d isappearance of this phenomenon is not expected in the near future. At present , another 
distortion, of a social nature, deserves a mention. Dur ing the period pr ior to the 
changeover , the social security system was no longer able to provide the p rev ious level 
of protection, which had an detrimental e f f ec t on the sys tem of financial support 
intended to assist students. For a short period, even university fees were in t roduced due 
to constra ining budgetary measures. Al though today there is no longer such a thing as a 
tuition fee for undergraduate students, it is not suggested that s tudents of lower social 
status are not at a disadvantage. Students of higher social status are well-represented at 
the faculties of law, and there has been hardly any ef for t m a d e in dea l ing with this 
inequality. Currently a system similar to those already operat ing in some other countries 
is being established, its principal aim being to help students in need by o f fe r ing loans at 
a preferential rate .1 3 
3. The Central Figures of the Judiciary: the Judges 
The situation of judges , like that of the other white-collar profess ionals , was not too 
„rosy" in the last decade of socialism, and in the per iod jus t a f ter the political 
changeover . Due to the degradingly low salaries, the number of appl icants for the j o b of 
an assistant j u d g e remained low. The few applicants for this j o b wanted e i ther to carry 
out high s tandard legal work in a peaceful and more or less poli t ically independent 
environment1 4 and had no opportunity of working as an attorney or legal adviser , or they 
wished to gain professional experience and useful contacts . S o m e in excep t iona l cases 
were mot ivated by an attraction to this profess ion. T o work in a Cour t was especial ly 
preferred by women who wished to have a professional ly chal lenging j o b , but did not 
• The new student loan system introduced by the government in 2001 might have a positive 
effect on the proportion of those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Research from the perspective of sociology of law found that the Courts enjoyed a relative degree of 
independence in (he 1970s and 1980s. Although the institutional independence of the Courts was attained 
neither in theory nor in practice, the ruling political power interfered in judgements only in exceptional cases. 
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want to neglect their families. Working as a judge gave them a degree of stability, in 
contrast to working as an attorney. A judge could take for granted a small but 
guaranteed income and could stay in his post until retirement. As a consequence, in the 
socialist era the prestige of the profession declined, the staff became dominated by 
female employees , and a degree of counter-selection could be observed. However, this 
counter-selection did not cause the professional standard to drop below a critical level. It 
was, above all, the elitist nature of higher education that ensured that the several 
hundred law students graduating each year f rom the universities were of a consistently 
high standard. So if someone having obtained a degree certificate with a poor rating 
applied for the job of assistant judge, his admission did not significantly affect the 
standard of the administration of justice. Moreover , a Court was admittedly the most 
suitable place for gaining professional experience. Consequently a number of graduates 
opted for a Court until having taken the final professional examinations, even if they 
wanted to become an attorney later on. 
This trend was m a d e possible in 1991 by the liberalisation of the admittance to the 
Bar and by the introduction of a unified system of professional examination. As a result, 
the fol lowing unusual situation developed in Hungary: for a recently appointed judge, or 
even for a judge having made an impressive career - in terms of remuneration and social 
prestige - working as an attorney seemed to be a much more favourable alternative than 
working as a judge . So, following the changeover, a great many left the Bench and 
applied for the Bar. 
With the radical increase in the salary of judges and prosecutors, the government of 
the early 1990s helped to alter this situation quite a lot. However, the salary of a judge 
could still not compete with the income of an attorney. The Courts, previously facing a 
manpower shortage, were suddenly inundated with law students graduating in increasing 
numbers and who had apparently recognised the financial security offered by this 
profession. The immediate effects of this process materialised primarily in the provincial 
towns in law schools where there were no vacancies even beforehand. In these towns 
there has been strong competition among applicants for a vacant j o b of assistant judge1 5 
involving students with the best academic performance. Consequently, the vacancies in 
Courts were gradually filled up in the smaller towns as well as in the capital. In addition, 
the Ministry responsible for the administration of the judiciary created several hundred 
new posts for judges which were mostly occupied by young lawyers. This trend was 
paralleled by a migration of experienced judges able to change their professions. The 
main reason for this phenomenon was that the salary increase had been gradually 
undermined by the effects of inflation. Moreover , due to the peculiarities of the salary 
system, there was not much difference between the income of judges starting their career 
and that of j udges with an established reputation. This generated a situation which is 
prevalent even today, namely that despite the large number of practising judges , young 
and old alike, there is still a shortage of judges with sufficient experience and adequate 
work capacity. 
Even though the financial reform of 1997 had beneficial effects , it was rather the 
gradual oversupply of attorneys that brought the above-mentioned process to a halt, and 
mm 1 
15 One way of obtaining-Ihe required work experience for the final professional exams is to work as an' 
assistant judge. 
thereby prevented the further migration of exper ienced lawyers. N o w a d a y s f ewer and 
fewer j u d g e s are willing to risk their positions for the precar ious p rofess ion of attorney.16 
T h e growing interest of the younger generat ions in the j o b s avai lable at Courts 
enabled them to apply the strictest criteria almost everywhere in the select ion of clerks 
of the Court , and later on for that of the judges . T h e w e l c o m e changes to the legal 
profession made by applying the strictest criteria meant , for instance, that the career of a 
j udge was at last appreciated in the eyes of lawyers. Alas , this was upse t by a new 
counter-select ive mechanism which, in our view at least, was not addressed by the 
earlier re form of the judiciary. 
In 1997 there was a comprehens ive re form of the judic iary . O n e of the constituent 
elements of this reform was the act on the legal status and the salary of judges , an 
important part of which was the modif ica t ion of the regula t ions and condit ions of 
obtaining a position as a judge . Even though the re forms m a d e progress in solving a 
great many problems, it did not achieve a breakthrough on one of the m o s t important 
issues, namely the sound selection of judges . The new Act int roduces stricter criteria 
concerning the admit tance of prospect ive j u d g e s and extends the per iod of practice 
necessary for the appointment f rom two to three years. Moreove r , the A c t prescribes a 
psychological examination prior to the appointment and makes the compet i t ion system 
mandatory with respect to the selection of the judges . T h e new regula t ions were 
supposed to ensure the consistency of the administration of jus t ice and to guarantee that 
the judges meet strict professional and ethical criteria. W e bel ieve, however , that this 
could have been and should be promoted by providing solid f inancial suppor t and by 
introducing detailed, object ive, impartial regulat ions govern ing the selection and 
promotion of judges . T h e re form neglected this question and, in our op in ion , the Act 
failed to of fer a solution to the underlying problem, and seems to have b rough t about a 
certain worsening of the situation. At present , similar to the prev ious si tuation, it is the 
president of the County Court17 who makes the actual decis ion on the nomina t ion of the 
clerks and judges of a Court , though official ly the appoin tment is the task of the 
President of the Republic. Whi le in the past the president of a County Cour t was obliged 
to take into account the opinion of the Judicial Councils,1 8 now because of the new 
regulation he is no longer required to do so. 
In our view, this is the point that renders the compet i t ion system rather problematic 
and practically unworkable . If the opinion of the Judicial Counci l can b e disregarded 
with respcct to the nomination and there are judges who are ready to capital ise on 
acquaintances, such an institution becomes a pseudo-democra t ic o rnament . The 
discretionary power rests too heavy on the actual person respons ib le for the nomination 
and extent to which he takes into account professional criteria. It is recognised , however, 
that these criteria d o n ' t always play a m a j o r role. At present, general ly it is the personal 
acquaintance that matters for the employment of clerks of a Cour t as well as the 
' According to several former judges interviewed by us, this can also be attributed to the fact that it is 
difficult for judges to get accustomed to having to perform tasks in Court before ex-colleagues. In some cases 
it can lead to emotional conflicts and embarrassing situations. 
1 There are 20 counties in Hungary. The County Court is the second level of the judicial structure. It is 
the president of the County Court who is responsible for the external administration of Courts belonging to a 
county. 
18 The Judicial Council is a self-governing body of judges, the members of which are selected by the 
judges of a particular county. These members are selected from among themselves. 
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appointment of judges. There aren't any competitive examinations, thus the competition 
system is a mere formality, At places where there are a great number of candidates, an 
assistant judge is employed only exceptionally on the basis of the results of the degree 
certifícate or of other achievements. It is common knowledge that the children of judges 
are preferred to other candidates, which is frequently and openly justified ideologically 
by the judges on the basis of family socialisation, the possibility of learning from the 
parents, and so on.19 The only aspect of affirmative action that could be considered 
neutral as regards personal connections, is perhaps the fact that male candidates are 
.preferred to female ones, as the judges responsible for the nominations consciously 
struggle against feminisation. There are minimum standards of course that must be met. 
Nevertheless, it is rather exceptional for a president making a decision concerning a 
nomination to completely disregard „personal" aspects. Thus a new form of counter-
selection can be observed since the political changeover. It is a most unfortunate 
phenomenon in the judiciary, since if the Courts are not impartial and objective in this 
field, society cannot be expected to have much confidence in impartial and objective 
verdicts in law-suits. 
Recent public opinion polls suggest that the index of confidence calculated for the 
judiciary is rather typical. It is much higher than that of the police, Parliament, the 
military, the government, the political parties and trade unions. However, it is very low 
compared to the confidence in the President of the Republic, the Constitutional Court or 
even the municipalities. Only one tenth of the population is of the opinion that judges 
work at an adequate pace. The majority were not quite sure that the judges are impartial 
and incorruptible.2" Although our survey shows that the majority of lawyers still believe 
that in today's Hungary the judges are incorruptible, a counter-selective mechanism like 
the above may cause not only a long-lasting deterioration in the standard of the 
administration of justice, but may also undermine the reputation of the Courts21 (Badó et 
al. 1997, 259), 
We propose that a new regulation of the selection process is urgently needed, one 
which is more objective and as detailed as possible so that, in the future, researchers of 
the judiciary will no longer have to survey family connections and personal 
acquaintances as well to provide a true analysis of the Courts. In addition to the 
requirement of objectivity in the selection process, it may be equally important to 
establish a system of criteria that could counter-balance the strengthening of conformity 
generally characterising the Courts in the continental law family. In Hungary and in the 
former socialist countries this pressure of conformity still plays an important role, as it 
was then vital for the communist regime to form and reinforce such attitudes. Without 
moral courage, therefore, judicial independence will remain an abstract idea, which can 
be discussed only on an academic level. Should this state of affairs remain as it is now, 
the sole reward for the judges in the civil service might be just to be recognised by a 
superior authority for anticipating its rulings. 
|lJ It would be fine if the children of legal professionals were also selected on the basis of open 
competition. This would then counter suspicions of nepotism as they would then have to be selected 
according to merit. 
20 Survey conducted by Medián Survey Institution. Népszabadság, 30 September, 2000. 
21 BADÓ ATTILA, Loss SÁNDOR, SZILÁGYI ISTVÁN, ZOMBOR, ATTILA. An Introduction to the Sociology 
of Law. Trans, Bíbor Kiadő. Miskolc, 1997. 
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4. The Prosecutors 
In 1936 the Soviet Socialist Constitution, which served as an example for other socialist 
countries, initiated a system of public prosecution entirely different from that of 
democratic States, The traditional activity of prosecutors, namely to carry out 
prosecuting duties in criminal proceedings before Courts became secondary, and the 
main function of the prosecution - owing to the lack of other organs ensuring legal 
protection - consisted in safeguarding the rule of law. In principle the prosecution 
should have been responsible for the supervision of individuals and the whole State 
organisation with the exception of the State organs on the highest level. In the socialist 
countries there were serious expectations of the prosecution body to secure the so-called 
„socialist legality", which could be realised only in a distorted form under the political 
circumstances. The organisation of public prosecution was provided for in the 
Hungarian Constitution of 1949. However, it was not until 1953 that the prosecution 
body really began to function. On the basis of the Constitution, an independent body, 
subordinate only to the authority of Parliament, came into existence. The prosecution 
quickly fell victim to the practice of using units of State organisations directly for the 
interests of the political system ruled by the one existing party. It was an open secret that 
the interests of party politics had a direct influence on the prosecution. The 
investigations carried out in the framework of the so-called general supervision of 
legality pursued mainly political objectives and, as a consequence, the prosecution had a 
, reputation even worse than that of the Courts. As a result, in the last decades of 
socialism working as a judge was much more respectable than working as a prosecutor 
despite the fact that judges and prosecutors received identical salaries. 
There have not been any major changes regarding the prosecution body since the 
political changeover. In 1989, subsequent to the amendment of the Constitution, the Act 
on the prosecution was also amended [Act V of 1972]. The most important change was 
that the term served by the chief public prosecutor became less dependent on that of the 
Parliamentary period of office by extending the duration of this position from four to six 
years. Afterwards debates began concerning the role of the prosecution and its place 
within the State organisation, which continue to this day. 
In summary, the changes concerning the public prosecution carried out in the course 
of the judicial reforms did not notably affect either the functions of prosecutors or the 
organisation of the prosecution body. The main objective of the amendments was to 
extend the changes concerning the legal status of judges to prosecutors as well, since the 
prosecutors react strongly to any attempts which aim to put the judges into a more 
advantageous position. The explanation for this can be found in a peculiar sense of 
solidarity and unity developed during the years of socialism. The prosecutors' and 
judges' offices were, and are, quite frequently located in the same building complex, and 
this, according to attorneys, has resulted in an „unsound" coexistence, incompatible with 
the requirements of" a constitutional State. Being well aware of this undesirable situation 
between the two social groups, the Bench has attempted to effect the division of 
different functions and initiated a slow separation process, creating manifest tensions 
from time to time. In return, the government has been attempting to maintain at least the 
equality of salaries. Although judicial independence and the privilege of working at 
home granted to judges in most cases makes the career of a judge more appealing even 
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today, it is hard to discover any differences between the two professions concerning 
other rights, which is also true with respect to obligations,22 Similar to the situation of 
judges, in the course of the reform of 1997 an examination of professional competence 
was introduced for prosecutors as well. Then the periodical evaluation of the work of 
prosecutors became mandatory. As in the case of judges, it can be observed that a new 
counter-selective mechanism replacing the former one is also having an impact on the 
selection of prosecutors. Before the political changeover it was difficult to fill the 
vacancies for prosecutors at many work places, as anyone who was qualified generally 
opted for another legal profession. However from 1992 the interest of being a prosecutor 
has steadily grown, which is also confirmed by statistical data. According to the 
statistics, there were almost 200 vacancies in 1991, but by 1998 these kind of vacancies 
disappeared. Consequently, because applications far exceed the positions available, the 
capitalisation on acquaintances plays a major role, the objective criteria becoming of 
secondary importance. 'It is not what you know, but who you know that is important.' 
No. of Cases per No. of 
Year Procedures Filed Prosecutors Prosecutor Permitted 
Employed Positions 
| 1988 335,240 939 358 1046 
1989 355,364 949 375 1046 
1990 440,278 963 458 1119 
1991 528,442 992 533 1166 
1992 525,832 1,025 514 1104 
1993 450,485 1,070 422 1108 
|_ 1994 553,228 1,098 504 1108 
1995 605,633 1,100 551 1108 
1996 656,512 1,109 592 1112 ' 
1997 718,502 1,169 615 1235 
1998 776,663 1,251 621 1235 
1999 723,986 1,265 573 1235 
5. The Attorneys 
5,1, The Reform of the Status of Attorneys after the Political Changeover 
Before the changeover, there was a big difference between underpaid salaried lawyers 
with low prestige (prosecutors, judges, notaries etc.) and a restricted number of 
attorneys forming an exclusive caste with a high standard of living. Practically the only 
way of achieving financial success for a lawyer was to become an attorney. However, 
without attorney parents, acquaintances and party connections it was virtually 
2 2 An interesting exception is the regulation on the termination of employment of judges and prosecutors 
reaching retirement age. In the case of both professions, employees ore allowed to work even af ter the 
compulsory retiring age of 70. However in the case of judges it is a right, while in the case of prosecutors it is 
only a possibility depending on permission. 
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impossible to be called to the Bar. In 1991 the Bar was reorganised . [Act XXII I of 
1991] 
Afterwards , in the course of the re form of the judiciary, a new law was passed in 
1998 that contained some amendments but adhered to the earl ier pr inciples . [Act XI of 
1998] 
With the act of 1991 the attorneys regained their autonomy, and the pr iva te practices 
of attorneys were also restored in accordance with Hungar ian t radi t ions and European 
norms. T h e former regulation of 1983 pertaining to counsels [Act IV of 1983] only 
permitted the pract ice of the legal profession in lawyers ' co-opcra t ives in o rder to secure 
State control. T h e Act of 1991, in contrast, gave attorneys the f r e e d o m to work in a 
private practice or in a lawyer 's off ice. This meant the terminat ion of forced co-
operation which, as a consequence, led to the dissolution of a cons ide rab le number of 
lawyers ' co-operat ives. 
In the new Act, the definit ion of the j o b description of an a t torney was also 
significantly changed. According to the regulat ion of 1958 [Act XI I of 1958], the 
attorney „should promote the enforcement of the c l ient ' s r ights with consc ien t ious work 
in order to secure socialist legality", The regulat ion of 1983 a lso says that an attorney 
must not hinder the authority in its lawful work. T h e new Act, however , omi ts this latter 
criterion and reads as follows: „The attorney by practising his p rofess ion p romotes thé 
maintenance of his cl ient 's rights and the fulf i lment of his obl igat ions by legal means 
and in a legal way. Furthermore, the attorney must assist the part ies in a law-suit , or in a 
peaceful sett lement reached without involving procedures before a Cour t . " 
Wi th the new Act the lawyer ' s fees were also liberalised. Accord ing to the Act of 
1983, lawyers ' fees could be charged only within the limits prescr ibed by the Attorney 
General. By virtue of the new Act, the fee became a matter of open mutual agreement, 
with the exception of the fee for counsels appointed by the Cour t , and the costs of 
attorneys that can be awarded in legal proceedings and in the case of jud ic ia l distraint. 
5.2. The Consequences of Liberalisation 
As we pointed out earlier, since 1991 anyone who met certain objec t ive requirements 
(law degree, professional examination, suitable of f ice) could be cal led to the Bar and 
commence practising. All these changes caused the Hungar ian communi ty of lawyers to 
be radically restructured within a few years and led to a steady increase in the number of 
attorneys. Whi l e in 1988 there were 2200 practising at torneys in Hungary , 7 5 0 of them 
working in the capital, after the liberalisation this number a lmost tripled within a couple 
of years. In 1995 their number stood at 6000, and by 1997 there were about 7000 
attorneys in Hungary, 3400 of them practising in Budapest , In 1999 the number of 
attorneys reached its peak (7900), and in 2000 a slight decl ine was observed. 2 3 T h e sharp 
increase in the number of attorneys in the 1990s can be accounted for not only by the 
appearance of recently graduated lawyers on the labour market , but also by the fac t that 
In addition to the increase in the number of actively practising attorneys it is worth noting that there 
has also been a growth in the number of attorneys who have suspended their profession. While in 1995 only 
about 5% of attorneys did so (and were thereby exempted from paying certain fixed costs), this figure rose to 
about 10% by 2000, which seems to indicate that it is evermore difficult to make a living on the income 
provided by that profession, as one of the typical reasons for the suspension is the exemption from paying Bar 
dues and other costs. 
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after the opening of a career which had been closed for the majority, many lawyers 
decided to change their professions. A survey on the mobility of lawyers revealed that it 
was primarily males who ventured to branch out, a point which also becomes apparent if 
one compares the proportion of men to women among attorneys with that of other legal 
professions. In contrast to the preponderance of women in the Courts, the prosecution 
office has considerably more male attorneys than female ones. This can be attributed to 
the fact that this profession depends very much on market conditions, and it thus means 
a hectic, frequently unpredictable way of life that cannot be easily reconciled with the 
role of a mother. A number of other reasons, typical not just of Hungary, can also be 
mentioned. These include confrontational frustration, the clients' strong demand 
(sometimes influenced by prejudice) for a male authority, and financial insecurity. 
The appearance of foreign lawyer's offices in Hungary is related to the liberalisation 
and privatisation as well, and, for a long time - until the Act of 1998 - these offices 
operated under unregulated conditions. They appeared on the scene at the same time as 
foreign investors and acquired a large slice of the legal market, which was regarded with 
displeasure by many. The aversion to this situation is illustrated by the sharp criticism 
which came the head of a renowned lawyer's office: „It was a sort of a colonisation that 
was brought about by international lawyer's offices in the 1990s in Hungary. They made 
their foreign clients believe that they could not succeed without them. However, it was 
the foreign lawyer's offices that could not succeed without foreign clients, as they had 
zero knowledge of the Hungarian legal system." The Act of 1998 regulated the activities 
of these offices, operating up until then behind the „mask" of agencies or operating by 
using the official seal of a Hungarian attorney. 
The problem of counter-selection is less acute in relation to attorneys compared to 
lawyers paid by the State budget. Nevertheless, due to the higher number of attorneys 
many talk about a certain professional and ethical deterioration, and about frequently 
occurring client dissatisfaction.24 This fact is highlighted by the growing number of legal 
proceedings against attorneys and by the frequent complaints filed to the Bar. Even 
though there is a demand for a more restrictive admission to the Bar, there seems to be 
no serious political intent by the government in this respect. In our view, such 
commitment would not provide a real and lasting solution anyway, as it would result in 
the return of the previous exclusive nature of the profession of an attorney. However, the 
symptoms of the process of self-regulation manifest themselves. Nowadays it is 
becoming more and more difficult to find an attorney or a lawyer's office that will 
employ recently graduated lawyers. On the other hand, a lawyer cannot take the final 
professional examinations required for independent practice without three years' work 
experience. In our opinion, in order to enforce the set of ethical and professional criteria, 
other solutions (e.g. a more differentiated and separate attorney's exam) should be 
established besides the natural selection of the market. 
24 TŰRÖK HELGA, BADÓ ATTILA. E lő tanu lmány a magyar j o g á s z s á g vizsgála tához. Bírák Lapja, 1997. 
7 : 1 0 4 - 1 1 2 . 
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6. On the border of Public and Private Services: the Public Notary 
At the end of our study it is worth ment ioning a group of lawyers, rarely discussed as 
„actors of the judic iary" in the relevant literature. However , we claim that they belong 
here and seem unique f rom a certain perspect ive . 
After the political changeover , not only did the c i rcumstances for a t torneys change 
quite markedly, but also those for public notaries [Act XLI of 1991]. T h e new regulation 
abolished the previous situation where public notaries worked for a Cour t practically as 
State employees. Moreover , in the spirit of Act X X X V of 1874 and in accordance with 
European tradition, the private activities of publ ic notaries were res tored. According to 
the new law, if certain requirements were met , it was the At torney General who 
appointed public notaries to an existing post. T h e Act regulates three m a j o r domains of 
notary activities. One of the most typical tasks of public notaries is the execut ion of legal 
documents. Another traditional task of public notaries is taking depos i t ions (legal 
documents, money and other valuables), as well as conduc t ing notary and other 
proceedings. 
Probate is the most f requent proceeding conducted by public notaries, According to 
the law, the ruling made by the public notary on notary proceedings is equal to that of 
Local Courts as far as appeals are concerned. 
Af ter the new Act on public notaries was f ramed in 1991, one can observe the 
forming of a caste of lawyers similar to the dist inguished communi ty of attorneys 
existing before the changeover. Public notaries, having worked as State employees and 
receiving a fixed salary, became all of a sudden member s of an isolated group of 
lawyers. Owing to the restriction of the number of public notaries, their o f f i ces can be 
obtained practically on a hereditary basis. T h e profess ion of publ ic notaries, on the 
border of public and private activities, can guarantee both security and high income for 
itself due to the limited competi t ion. It could be asked whether this si tuation is equally 
favourable to society as well. 
Hungarian Lawyers in the Making: Selection Distortions after the Democratic Changes in Hungary - 17 
ANGELUSZ RÓBERT, BALOGH ZOLTÁN, KÖRMENDY MÁRIA, LEDERER PÁL, SZÉKELY 
MÁRIA:. A j o g á s z s á g társadalmi helyzete és szakmai é le tú t ja . Szociológiai füzetek. 
Oktatási M i n i s z t é r i u m M a r x i z m u s - L e n i n i z m u s Oktatás i Főosz tá lya . Budapes t , 1977. 
ATIYAH, P.S.: Pragmatism and Theory in English Law. S tevens and Sons . L o n d o n , 
1987. 
BADÓ ATTILA: A t á r sada lom lelki ismerete vagy a le lk i ismeret lenek társasága. Magyar 
Jog, 1 9 9 3 . 4 0 : 6 5 4 - 6 6 2 . 
BADÓ ATTILA, LOSS SÁNDOR, SZILÁGYI ISTVÁN, ZOMBOR ATTILA: Bevezetés a 
jogszociológiába. B í b o r Kiadó. Misko lc , 1997. 
BÁN TAMÁS: AZ E u r ó p a T a n á c s ö tven éve: t agságunk hatásai a m a g y a r j o g f e j l ő d é s r e . 
Acta Humana, 1999 . 3 5 - 3 6 : 1 - 2 3 . 
BÁRD KÁROLY: A bün te tő el járási törvény tervezete az európa i j o g f e j l ő d é s b e n . 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1998. 5 3 : 1 8 7 - 1 9 1 . 
BERNÁTH ZOLTÁN: Justitia tudathasadása. Népbíróság a nép nélkUl, a nép ellen. Püski 
Kiadó . B u d a p e s t , 1993. . 
BRAGYOVA ANDRÁS:. Igazságtéte l és nemzetközi j o g . Glossza az A l k o t m á n y b í r ó s á g 
ha tá roza tához . Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1993. 3 5 : 2 1 3 - 2 6 3 . 
DÁVID IBOLYA: A m a g y a r tö rvényhozás tendenciái a polgár i é s a gazdaság i 
j oga lko t á sban . Magyar Jog, 1993. 4 0 : 1 1 2 - 1 1 5 . 
References 
7. Conclusion 
T h e H u n g a r i a n legal p ro fess ion went through a unique , compl i ca t ed and painful 
transit ional pe r iod fo l lowing the fall of the communis t regime. T h e communi ty of 
lawyers has been radica l ly res t ructured and substant ial ly en la rged . In the per iod 1990-
2000 new cha l l enges were met and overcome , and new att i tudes d e v e l o p e d . 
T h e poli t ical c h a n g e o v e r also led to cor respondingly large changes in the jud ic ia ry . 
Some aspec t s of the m e c h a n i s m s of recrui tment and p romot ion , and the ways of 
manag ing the Cour t s , howeve r , have remained pract ical ly intact apar t f r o m a c h a n g e of 
ideological f r a m e w o r k and an upda t ing of the vocabula ry e m p l o y e d . In the Sta te 
control led sector of the legal p rofess ion the counter -se lec t ive pract ices charac ter i s ing the 
previous era have surv ived , and have even b e c o m e m o r e p r o n o u n c e d as the compet i t ion 
a m o n g law gradua tes r eaches a hi therto unheard-of f ie rceness . It is our firm bel ief that in 
this field the lack of m a r k e t economy condi t ions has to b e countered b y a prec ise and 
detai led regula t ion of admiss ion based on an open sys tem of compet i t ion . 
T h e transi t ional pe r i od is far f rom over. It is virtually imposs ib le to ascertain the 
exact o u t c o m e of these p ro found changes . Never the less , the m a j o r t rends and p rob l ems 
can a l ready be seen a f t e r a decade of exper ience , observa t ion and poll ing, on the basis 
of which m e a n i n g f u l p roposa l s might be formula ted . T h e present s tudy purpor t s to do no 
more , and will h o p e f u l l y contr ibute to the better unders tanding of a f rag i le segment of a 
typical Cent ra l E u r o p e a n society in transit ion. 
18 - ATTILA B ADÓ - JÁNOS RÓKA - ZSOLT NAGY 
ECKHARDT FERENC: Magyar alkotmány- és jogtörténet. Osiris, Budapes t , 2000 . 
FLECK ZOLTÁN: A bírói függet lenség jogszociológiai v izsgála tának előfeltevései, 
Társadalomkutatás, 1993. 82 -92 . 
FŰRÉSZ KLÁRA: AZ igazságszolgáltatás a lkotmányos szabályozása . Társadalmi Szemle, 
1 9 9 8 . 5 0 : 4 6 - 5 3 . 
HERMANN JOACHIM: A büntetőel járás r e fo rmja Kelet- és Nyuga t -Európában . Magyar 
Jog, 1993. 4 0 : 2 9 3 - 3 0 6 . 
HORECZKY KÁROLY, ILONCAI ZSOLT: A z igazságszolgáltatás helyzete Magyarországon. 
Bírák Lapja, 1996 .6 :243 . 
HYMAN, HERBERT: Survey Design andAnalysis. Principles, Cases and Procedures. The 
Free Press of Glencoe. 1965. 
KECSKÉS LÁSZLÓ, MACZONKAI MIHÁLY: Joga lka lmazásunk előtt álló feladatok az 
európai jogi harmonizáció folyamatában. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1999. 54:73. 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: Magyar polgári eljárásjog. Osiris Kiadó, Budapes t , 1998. 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: A rendelkezési és a tárgyalási elv a Pp. 1995. évi módos í t á sa után. 
Magyar Jog, 1 9 9 6 . 4 3 : 2 7 8 - 2 8 5 . 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: Jogászképzés a rendszervál tás után. Magyar Jog, 1999. 46 :91-93 . 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: Magyar Polgári Eljárásjog. Osiris Kiadó, Budapes t , 1998. 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: Perkultúra. Pannónia Könyvek, Pécs ,1993. 
KENGYEL MIKLÓS: Az európai polgári e l já rás jog és a magyar jog fe j lődés . Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1 9 9 2 . 4 7 : 1 6 6 - 1 7 1 . 
KERTÉSZ IMRE, PUSZTAI LÁSZLÓ: Quo vadis, büntetőel járás? Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
1992. 4 7 : 1 7 2 - 1 8 1 . 
KIRÁLY TIBOR: A védelem és a védő a büntetőügyekben. Közgazdaság i és Jogi 
Könyvkiadó, Budapest , 1962. 
KIRÁLY TIBOR: A büntetőel járás re formja elé. Magyar Jog, 1993. 4 0 : 2 5 7 - 2 6 1 . 
KULCSÁR KÁLMÁN: A bírósági szervezet fej lesztéséről , Magyar Jog, 1990. 37 :1-10 . 
KULCSÁR KÁLMÁN: A népi ülnök a bíróságon. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapes t , 1971. 
LICHTENSTEIN JÓZSEF: A törvényes .bíróhoz való jog és az ügyelosztási terv a német 
alaptörvényben és a törvénykezési szervezeti jogban . Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1993. 
4 8 : 1 5 - 2 2 . 
LICHTENSTEIN JÓZSEF: Abrégé de l'organisation judiciaire hongroise. J A T E Press 
Kiadó, Szeged, 1996, 
LICHTENSTEIN JÓZSEF: AZ igazságszolgáltatás rendszere Franciaországban. M T A PTI 
Soksz. Budapes t . 
LICHTENSTEIN JÓZSEF: Megjegyzések a bírósági szervezeti törvény módosításáról. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1992. 4 7 : 1 5 7 - 1 6 5 . 
LICHTENSTEIN JÓZSEF: Vázlat a rendes bírói szervezetről és b í ráskodásról 1949-1991. 
Bírák Lapja. A Magyar Bírói Egyesület folyóirata, 1992. 2 : 2 4 - 3 1 . 
MACCORMICK NEIL D., SUMMERS RÓBERT S.: Interpreting Statutes. A comparative 
Study. Dar tmouth Publishing Company Limited. A lde r sho t , 199 l . 
NÉMETH JÁNOS: AZ átmeneti időszak igazságszolgál ta tásának je len legi helyzete a 
közép- és kelet-európai országokban. Magyar Jog, 1998. 4 5 : 1 2 9 - 1 4 1 . 
POKOL BÉLA: Felsőbírósági jogér te lmezés Magyarországon . Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
1 9 8 9 . 4 4 : 9 8 - 1 0 5 . 
ROGERS CARLR: Counselling and Psychotherapy. N e w York . 1942. 
Hungarian Lawyers in the Making: Selection Distortions after the Democratic Changes in Hungary - 19 
ROGERS CARL R: T h e Non-Di rec t ive M e t h o d s as a Techn ique in Social Research . 
American Journal ofSociology, 1945. 50 . 
ROGERS CARL R: Client Centered Therapy. N e w York . 1951. 
RUGG, DONALD: A Study of the No-Opinion Vote in Public Opinion Polls. Ph .D. diss. 
Pr inceton Univers i ty , Pr inceton. 1941. 
SCHEUCH, ERWIN K.: Das Interview in der Sozialforschung. In Kön ig ed . H a n d b u c h 
der Empi r i s chen Soz ia l fo r schung . Ers ter Band . Fe rd inánd Enke Ver lag . Stuttgart , 
1962. 
SOLT PÁL: AZ O r s z á g o s Igazságszolgál ta tás i T a n á c s ünnepé lyes a lakuló ülésére. Bírák 
Lapja, 1998. 8:8. 
STTPTA ISTVÁN: A magyar bírósági rendszer története. Mul t ip lex M e d i a - D e b r e c e n U.P. 
Deb recen , 1997. 
TÖRÖK HELGA, BADÓ, ATTILA: E lő tanu lmány a magya r jogászság v izsgá la tához . Bírák 
Lapja, 1 9 9 7 . 7 : 1 0 4 - 1 1 2 . 
UTASI ÁGNES: Az ügyvédek hivatásrendje. Ú j M a n d á t u m Könyvkiadó , Budapes t , 1999. 
VARGA CSABA: Szabad -e í télnünk a múl t ró l? Jogf i lozóf ia i megfon to lá sok . Társadalmi 
Szemle, 1 9 9 2 . 4 7 : 8 5 - 9 0 . 
VARGA CSABA: Transition to rule of law. On the democratic transformation in 
Hungary. Akapr in t Kf t . Budapes t , 1995. 
VASTAGH PÁL: Igazságszolgál ta tás i r e fo rm - j o g v é d e l m i r endsze rünkben . Magyar Jog, 
1 9 9 7 . 4 4 : 7 0 5 - 7 1 1 . 
VAVRÓ ISTVÁN: A bí rósági ügyforga lom és munka teher . Bírák Lapja, 1994. 2 :182 . 
VLLÁGHI MIKLÓS, EÖRSI GYULA: Magyar polgári jog. T a n k ö n y v k i a d ó . Budapes t , 1962. 
VISEGRÁDY ANTAL, GÁTOS GYÖRGY: G o n d o l a t o k a bírói j o g a l k a l m a z á s 
ha tékonyságáró l . Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1 9 9 0 . 4 5 : 2 7 6 - 2 8 2 . 
WALLACHER LAJOS: Bírói aktivitás és fé legyenlőség a polgári pe rben , avagy: 
kor lá tozha tó-e a bírói tú lbuzgóság. Magyar Jog, 1 9 9 6 . 4 3 : 8 7 2 - 8 8 1 . 
ZLNNER TIBOR: H á b o r ú s bűnösök , népbí róságok . História, 1982. 5 5 - 6 1 . 
20 - ATTILA B ADÓ - JÁNOS RÓKA - ZSOLT NAGY 
BADÓ ATTILA - BÓKA JÁNOS - NAGY ZSOLT 
SZELEKCIÓS TORZÍTÓ MECHANIZMUSOK A JOGÁSZI 
PROFESSZIÓN BELÜL 
(Összefogla lás) 
Jelen tanulmány azzal az elhatározással született, hogy a magya r j o g á s z s á g struktúráját, 
a jogász i professzión belül található kü lönböző szférák munká já t leír ja , ismertesse a 
szakmán belül a rendszervál tás után az ú j társadalmi, gazdasági környeze t hatására 
bekövetkezet t változásokat. Emellett a dolgozat fő célja, hogy fe lh ív ja a Figyelmet az 
igazságszolgáltatás szereplőinek kiválasztása folytán fe lmerülő prob lémákra , részletes 
leírást ad jon róla, és esetlegesen fel tár ja az okokat. A z ismertetés k i ter jed a bírói; 
ügyészi, ügyvédi , közjegyzői szférára, de nem hagyható f igye lmen kívül a jogi oktatás 
sem. 
A társadalom szinte minden sz fé rá jában , a kü lönböző szakmai eliteken belül 
működnek azok a mechanizmusok, melyek az utánpótlást , i l letve a már meglévő tagok 
további képzését hivatottak biztosítani. Nincs ez máshogy a jogász i szakmai eliten belül 
sem, az említett rekrutációs és reputációs mechanizmusok itt is é rvényesülnek . Azonban 
maga a szelekció minősége, a rendszer a lkalmassága a megfe le lő sz ínvonalú utánpótlás 
biztosítására sok esetben vizsgálatokat igényel. A nem megfe l e lő szelekciós rendszer 
(például a meri tokratikus előmenetel és kiválasztás helyett az autokrácia túlsúlya) 
hosszú távon súlyos gondokat okozhat az adott professzión belül. Különösen fontossá 
válik ez a kérdés annak tükrében, hogy Magyarország a köze l jövőben az Európai Unió 
tagjává válik. 
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